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Abstract 
Law enforcement at sea requires specialised capabilities, training and 
legislation due to the unique legal and physical environment within which it is 
conducted. The South African National Defence Force (SANDF) is increasingly 
deployed to enforce South African law at sea, and a constitutional democracy with 
entrenched human rights requires that the SANDF performs this function in a lawful 
and compliant manner with reference to international and domestic law. The present 
study sought to contribute to a greater understanding of the legal framework for law 
enforcement at sea by the military, and surveyed the applicable international and 
domestic legal prescripts. The law enforcement powers of the SANDF are pointed 
out in this article and discussed in the context of the applicable legal prescripts that 
straddle the boundaries between a number of different areas of law. Some 
observations are made on possible human rights concerns, cooperation with other 
government departments, and considerations for the military commander are pointed 
out before conclusions are drawn. 
Introduction 
The Republic of South Africa is a maritime nation with a coastline that 
exceeds 3 900 kilometres. Its exclusive economic zone (EEZ) encompasses more 
than 1,5 million square kilometres, and a successful claim to a continental shelf could 
potentially add an additional 880 000 square kilometres to the South African 
maritime area of interest. The South African 
dependence on maritime rights is 
accentuated by the fact that the shipping 
lanes around the southern tip of Africa are 
some of the busiest shipping lanes in the 
world, and maritime transport and trade is the 
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lifeline of the South African energy, manufacturing, mining and retail sectors. 
Importantly, the contribution of commercial fishing to the economy as well as food 
security cannot be understated, and the commercial fishing industry is valued at more 
than R4,8 billion annually, and contributes hundreds of thousands of tons of fish to 
the diet of ordinary South Africans. Globally, it is estimated that fish provides 
approximately 25% of world animal protein supply, and a lack of protection, control 
and measures to ensure sustainability of fishing stocks could have devastating effects 
for coastal states such as South Africa.1 
Illegal fishing is increasing in the South African EEZ. Recent incidents of 
South African law enforcement agencies acting against foreign vessels suspected of 
illegally fishing in the South African EEZ bear testimony to this fact. Role players 
in policing South African marine zones are the Department of Agriculture, Forestry 
and Fisheries (DAFF), Department of Transport, South African Maritime Safety 
Authority, Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism, South African Police 
Service (SAPS), Department of Home Affairs, South African Revenue Service 
(SARS), National Sea Rescue Institute (NSRI) and Department of Defence 
(primarily in the form of the South African Army, Air Force and Navy). Such 
incidents illustrate the critical role of DAFF and the South African Navy in the initial 
interception of suspect vessels.2 
In practical terms, it is only DAFF and the Department of Defence that 
maintain the resources that are required to intercept and seize vessels engaged in 
illegal fishing in the EEZ, or conduct maritime hot pursuit operations that extend 
beyond the EEZ. DAFF operates a fleet of four vessels consisting of three inshore 
protection vessels (IPVs) and one offshore protection vessel (OPV).3 Besides a well-
                                                     
1 The South African Navy has published an unclassified Maritime Doctrine for the South 
African Navy at www.navy.mil.za/peoplesnavy/index.htm. Chapter 2 of the Maritime 
Doctrine contains a compilation of facts from which the summary provided herein was 
drawn. It can be viewed at www.navy.mil.za/sangp100/sangp100_ch02.pdf; also see 
Simpson, G ‘Collaboration, the Currency of SA’s Ocean Expansion’ (2016) Ship Year 
at 32–3; Beckner, J ‘South African Air Border Control: The Maritime Challenge’ 
(2011) 3 (12) Global Aviator at 32. 
2 The following websites provide an overview of the major incidents reported in May and June 










known special forces capability within the Joint Operations Division, and maritime 
helicopter and fixed-wing patrol aircraft maintained by the South African Air Force, 
the South African Navy operates approximately nine vessels (ranging from a fleet 
replenishment ship and frigates to coastal mine hunters and fast attack craft amongst 
other) that can be utilised in a direct law enforcement role. The South African Navy 
also operates three submarines that are useful in the indirect support role (primarily 
for surveillance and evidence gathering).4 
The importance of the South African EEZ is evidenced by initiatives such as 
Operation Phakisa that is striving to unlock the potential of the Oceans Economy for 
South Africa,5 and by the fact that in some circles, the South African maritime 
domain is referred to as South Africa’s “tenth province”.6 There is a new awakening 
to the realities that South Africa needs to strengthen its ability to protect its marine 
living resources and enforce its rights over its marine resources. However, as a 
constitutional democracy, South Africa is also committed to the rule of law and 
respect for human rights, and it is at the intersection of the policing of its maritime 
zones and respect for human rights that the law enforcement officer finds him- or 
herself. A brief glance at the resources mentioned above makes it clear that the 
SANDF could increasingly expect to find itself pressed when called upon to assist 
government in fulfilling this task, and the airman or seaman will increasingly 
become the law enforcement officer that must execute the mission. 
This article aims to contribute to the clarification and dissemination of 
information on the general powers of the SANDF to enforce South African law at 
sea. It will attempt to contextualise the nature of the task to be performed by the 
military, summarise applicable domestic and international legal principles, raise 
possible concerns from a human rights perspective, and discuss possible 
considerations for military planners. The article does not intend to discuss the 
content and scope of the powers to be exercised by the individual maritime law 
enforcement officer comprehensively, and its scope is specifically focussed on the 
enforcement of South African law in the South African maritime zones. In addition, 
the article does not focus on maritime piracy, as this topic has been dealt with by the 
                                                     
4 Unknown author on the equipment of the South African Navy on the South African Navy 
official website available at www.navy.mil.za/equipment/index.htm. 
5 Unknown author on ‘Operation Phakisa – Oceans Economy’ on the official website of the 
Department of Environmental Affairs available at 
www.environment.gov.za/projectsprogrammes/operationphakisa/oceanseconomy. 
6 Unknown author on the official blog site of the South African Maritime Safety Authority 
available at blog.samsa.org.za/tag/south-african-oceans/. 
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author elsewhere.7  
Nature of law enforcement tasks performed by the SANDF at sea 
 At a conceptual level, the tasks performed by the maritime law 
enforcement agencies of a coastal state are ultimately aimed at safeguarding and 
enforcing the interests and rights of such coastal state. The exclusive rights to exploit 
the resources found within the maritime domain are supported by the exercise of 
criminal jurisdiction of the coastal state to prevent and punish violations. These 
rights of a coastal state include conserving and managing the living and non-living 
natural resources of the waters, seabed and subsoil, and the prevention and 
punishment of breaches of laws protecting those rights. 
Practically, the maritime law enforcement officer is concerned with ensuring 
compliance with laws and regulations. Examples are licence and quota compliance 
and enforcement, the maintenance of safety standards and safety compliance, the 
prevention and punishment of marine pollution, and other measures as may be 
necessary. The physical actions taken by maritime law enforcement officers could 
then include crime intelligence gathering, evidence gathering and investigation of 
suspected criminal activities, pursuit of suspect vessels, the seizure or arrest of 
vessels and other equipment, boarding operations, inspections, arrest and detention 
of suspects, and initiation of judicial proceedings.8 
During each of these actions, the maritime law enforcement officer has to 
manage the risks of the violation of human rights when exercising the powers 
conferred by law, and when the use of force to board, search, arrest or pursue 
suspects is required. Moreover, the maritime law enforcement officer may be faced 
with situations where deadly force may have to be used to protect him- or herself, or 
even third parties, from the threat of severe injury or death because of the actions of 
suspects. In these situations, maritime law enforcement officers may have to rely on 
international and domestic law to interpret the powers conferred on them. It is 
important to ascertain whether members of the SANDF have the power to enforce 
South African law at sea in each scenario, especially in a constitutional democracy 
that respects the rule of law. Where powers are conferred, it is equally important to 
                                                     
7 Smit, AR ‘Selected Aspects of Applicable International Human Rights and Humanitarian 
Law in Naval Counter-piracy Operations of the East Coast of Africa’ in De Wet E & 
Kleffner J (eds) Convergence and Conflicts (Pretoria University Press 2014) at 193–
210. 
8 As an example, the Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries issued a media 
statement on 9 September 2016 that details actions taken in relation to a Taiwanese 
vessel, the Chin Jen Wen, and the steps taken between 7 and 9 September 2016 to 
intercept the vessel and escort it to a port for inspection.  
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be conversant with the circumstances under which such powers may be exercised, 
as well as with the scope and content of each of those powers. 
Although it would be preferable, and indeed the norm, for civilian law 
enforcement officials to take any action required in this regard, the military is 
frequently asked to assist. The SANDF is the lead government entity in some of 
these law enforcement operations, or the only governmental authority present in a 
situation. The tasks that members of the SANDF must perform range from merely 
providing a platform for other law enforcement officials executing their tasks to 
providing active support or to conducting the law enforcement operation itself.9  
By way of example, in 2003, South Africa and Australia co-operated in a 
classic maritime hot pursuit operation to eventually arrest the Viarsa 1, an 
Uruguayan-flagged vessel in what was then regarded as the longest maritime hot 
pursuit operation yet. The Viarsa 1 was suspected of being engaged in illegal fishing. 
The pursuit commenced on 07 August 2003 when an Australian law enforcement 
vessel ordered the Viarsa 1 to stop while in the Australian EEZ, and the crew of the 
Viarsa 1 decided to flee. The pursuit lasted three weeks, covered almost 4 000 
nautical miles and was joined by fisheries law enforcement vessels from the United 
Kingdom and other vessels from South Africa. With South African Navy assistance, 
the Viarsa 1 was eventually arrested and returned to Australia.10 
Legal framework 
International legal framework 
 For this article, the international legal framework is acknowledged to be 
wider than the present discussion, and includes many more multilateral treaties than 
those considered below. However, in the interests of limiting the discussion to the 
most prominent aspects to be considered, the instruments listed were kept to the bare 
minimum required for the provision of an analysis of the most general principles, 
rights and obligations applicable. 
                                                     
9 See the article by defenceWeb of 26 May 2016: ‘Navy Plays Major Role in Impounding 600 
Tons of Squid and Other Fish as Well as Foreign Trawlers’, available at 
www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=43634:nav
y-plays-major-role-in-impounding-600-tons-of-squid-and-other-fish-as-well-as-
foreign-trawlers&catid=108:maritime-security&Itemid=23. Also see an article by 
Simpson, GP ‘Bethune Ocean Warrior’ (2016) Ship Year at 26–31.  
10 Williams, J in USAToday.com Australians nab suspected illegal fishing boat after 4,000-




United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) of 10 December 
198211 is regarded as a reflection of customary international law in many respects.12 
It determines that the sovereignty of a coastal state extends to the territorial sea, the 
air space over the territorial sea as well as to its bed and subsoil.13 UNCLOS also 
provides that a coastal state retains “sovereign rights” for the purpose of exploring 
and exploiting, conserving and managing the living and non-living natural resources 
of the waters, seabed and subsoil within the EEZ.14 
Nationals of states other than the coastal state shall comply with and respect 
the conservation measures and with other terms and conditions established in the 
laws and regulations of the coastal state when fishing in the EEZ of the coastal state. 
Such laws and regulations must be consistent with UNCLOS, and may relate to a list 
of issues such as licensing, fishing quotas and enforcement procedures.15 When 
providing for the competence of a coastal state to enforce its rights with regard to its 
EEZ, UNCLOS allows a coastal state – in the exercise of its rights to explore, exploit, 
conserve and manage the living resources in the EEZ – to take such measures as may 
be necessary to ensure compliance with the laws and regulations (including fisheries-
related provisions) adopted by it in conformity with UNCLOS. Such measures 
include boarding, inspection, arrest and judicial proceedings.16 It also provides that 
arrested vessels and their crews shall be promptly released upon the posting of 
reasonable bond or other security, and that coastal state penalties for violations of 
fisheries laws and regulations in the EEZ may not include imprisonment in the 
                                                     
11 Available at 
www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_overview_convention.htm 
12 Shaw, MN International Law 6 ed (Cambridge 2012) at 556; Dugard, J International Law: A 
South African Perspective 4 ed (Juta 2011) at 368. Dugard also cites various cases 
before the International Court of Justice wherein the provisions of the UNCLOS have 
been cited as evidence of customary international law at footnote 14. Also see the 
Joint Statement by the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics of 23 September 1989 at 
http://www.un.org/depts/los/doalos_publications/LOSBulletins/bulletinpdf/bulE14.pdf 
13 Arts (1) and 2(2); the territorial sea may not extent beyond 12 nautical miles from the 
baselines of the coastal State in accordance with art 3 of the UNCLOS.  
14 Art 56(1)(a). 
15 Art 62(4)(a)–(k). 
16 Art 73(1); arts 72(2), (3) and (4) also contain provisions that require arrested vessels and 
their crews to be promptly released upon the posting of reasonable bond or other 
security, that coastal state penalties for violations of fisheries laws and regulations in 
the EEZ may not include imprisonment in the absence of agreements to the contrary, 
and that the coastal state shall promptly notify the flag state, through appropriate 
channels, of the action taken and of any penalties subsequently imposed in cases 
involving arrest or detention of foreign vessels. 
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absence of agreements to the contrary by the states concerned, or any other form of 
corporal punishment.17 In instances of arrest or detention of foreign vessels, the 
coastal state must promptly notify the flag state of the action taken and of any 
penalties subsequently imposed.18 
With reference to the continental shelf and the sovereign rights that a coastal 
state holds over its continental shelf, UNCLOS confirms that a coastal state exercises 
sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting the natural resources 
over its continental shelf.19 These rights of a coastal state over its continental shelf 
are exclusive, and if the coastal state does not explore the continental shelf or exploit 
its natural resources, no one may undertake these activities without the express 
consent of the coastal state.20 
It is easy to describe the rights of a coastal state within its territory, but the 
pursuit of completeness requires that the right of hot pursuit as described in article 
111 of UNCLOS, and that is exercised partly extra-territorially, be mentioned. The 
right of hot pursuit allows a coastal state to pursue a foreign vessel outside the 
territorial sea or EEZ to enforce its laws when the competent authorities of the 
coastal state have good reason to believe that the ship has violated the laws and 
regulations of the coastal state. The exercise of the right demands that pursuit must 
be commenced when the foreign ship or one of its boats is within the internal waters, 
the archipelagic waters, the territorial sea or the contiguous zone of the pursuing 
state, and may only be continued outside the territorial sea or the contiguous zone if 
the pursuit has not been interrupted. The right of hot pursuit also applies to violations 
of laws and regulations of the coastal state in the EEZ or on the continental shelf. 
The right of hot pursuit ceases as soon as the vessel being pursued enters the 
territorial sea of its own state or of a third state.21 There are several other formal 
requirements for the competent exercise of the right of hot pursuit, such as relevant 
positions of vessels, signalling, uninterrupted pursuit and compensation that will not 
be discussed in the present context. However, it is important to remember that hot 
pursuit may be exercised only by warships or military aircraft, or other ships or 
aircraft clearly marked and identifiable as being on government service and 
authorised to that effect.22  
                                                     
17 Art 73(2) and (3). 
18 Art 73(4). 
19 Art 77(1). 
20 Art 77(2). 
21 Art 111(1)–(3). 
22 Art 111(5); also see the brief discussion that follows below regarding the use of force in law 
enforcement operations at sea. 
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Rome Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of 
Maritime Navigation   
The Rome Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the 
Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA Convention) of 10 March 198823 is not 
regarded as constituting customary international law. Other than major portions of 
UNCLOS, the SUA Convention is applicable only between parties to it. It provides 
a wider basis for the prosecution of maritime-related crime than UNCLOS. It has 
shed the constraints that UNCLOS retains surrounding piracy when creating a 
further international maritime crime in respect of the place where the crime was 
committed, the motives of the perpetrators, and the involvement of more than one 
ship. South Africa, as a party to the SUA Convention, is obliged to establish and 
exercise criminal jurisdiction over the crime defined through Article 3(1):24 
Article 3 
1 Any person commits an offence if that person unlawfully and intentionally: 
(a) seizes or exercises control over a ship by force or threat thereof or any 
other form of intimidation; or  
(b) performs an act of violence against a person on board a ship if that act is 
likely to endanger the safe navigation of that ship; or  
(c) destroys a ship or causes damage to a ship or to its cargo which is likely 
to endanger the safe navigation of that ship; or  
(d) places or causes to be placed on a ship, by any means whatsoever, a 
device or substance which is likely to destroy that ship, or cause damage 
to that ship or its cargo which endangers or is likely to endanger the safe 
navigation of that ship; or  
(e) destroys or seriously damages maritime navigational facilities or 
seriously interferes with their operation, if any such act is likely to 
endanger the safe navigation of a ship; or  
(f) communicates information which he [or she] knows to be false, thereby 
endangering the safe navigation of a ship; or  
                                                     
23 Available at www.un.org/en/sc/ctc/docs/conventions/Conv8.pdf; it is also important to take 
note of the 2005 Protocol to the SUA Convention, as well as other applicable 
instruments such as the International Convention against the Taking of Hostages of 
1979 that can be found at www.un.org/en/sc/ctc/docs/conventions/Conv5.pdf; the 
SUA Convention as well as the 2005 Protocol to the SUA Convention was acceded to 
by South Africa on 8 July 2005, and entered into force for South Africa on 6 October 
2005.  
24 Arts 5 and 6 of the SUA Convention; De Bondt, S Prosecuting Pirates and Upholding 
Human Rights Law: Taking Perspective, One Earth Future Working Paper (2010) at 7; 
art 3(2) also criminalises the attempting commission of the offence, abetting in the 
commission of the offence, or threatening in the context of the offence. 
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(g) injures or kills any person, in connection with the commission or the 
attempted commission of any of the offences set forth in subparagraphs 
(a) to (f). 
Where UNCLOS was silent on minimum rights, the SUA Convention goes 
further by providing certain minimum rights to be afforded.25 South Africa 
incorporated this crime into domestic law, as will be indicated below, and the 
SANDF must be ready to act when ordered to do so with reference to the combating 
of this crime. The SANDF may be involved in the initial arrest and handing over of 
the suspect to the relevant law enforcement officials who will be responsible for 
further detention and trial, but the process after handover will not concern the 
SANDF save for the real possibility of having to testify in subsequent proceedings, 
or having to defend itself against possible claims relating to the violation of rights, 
injuries or damage to property. 
The use of force in maritime law enforcement 
 International law provides guidelines on the principles to be followed when 
force is used to conduct maritime law enforcement operations, and in relation to the 
stopping and boarding of a vessel. The International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea 
(ITLOS), in the matter of the MV Saiga, confirmed: 
[I]nternational law … requires that the use of force must be avoided as far as 
possible and, where force is inevitable, it must not go beyond what is 
reasonable and necessary in the circumstances. Considerations of humanity 
must apply in the law of the sea, as they do in other areas of international 
law.26  
In 2007, in an arbitration ruling between Guyana and Suriname, the MV 
Saiga and Nicaragua case were quoted and relied upon when it was accepted that 
international law allows the use of force in maritime law enforcement operations 
provided that such force is unavoidable, reasonable and necessary.27 
Although international law permits the use of force in maritime law 
enforcement operations, the scope thereof must be measured on a case-by-case basis 
in accordance with what would be unavoidable, reasonable and necessary in the 
circumstances. The application of these principles is subject to interpretation, and it 
requires extensive training to empower a law enforcement official to make the right 
                                                     
25 Art 10. 
26 See paras 153–159 in M/V Saiga (Saint Vincent and the Grenadines v Guinea) (No 2) 
ITLOS Rep 1999 10 120 ILR 143.  
27 Award of the Arbitral Tribunal Constituted Pursuant to art 287 and in accordance with 
Annex VII of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea at paras 405, 419 
and 440; award of 17 September 2007, 47 ILM (2008) 66. 
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decisions in stressful, dangerous and demanding circumstances. The level of 
resistance to a law enforcement action is a very important factor to be considered, 
and it has a direct bearing on what is reasonable and necessary in the circumstances. 
The gradual escalation of the level of violence, where possible and in the absence of 
a clear and present danger to life or limb, commences with normal communication 
of intent, through a show of force and aggressive manoeuvring, to the display and 
eventual firing of weapons. The initial use of weapons may commence without being 
aimed at the offending vessel or person, and in the absence of a threat to life or limb, 
and will not be aimed at taking a life, but at disabling a vessel to allow the law 
enforcement officials to discharge their responsibilities. 
The use of force in the form of mounted weapons aboard a ship is of course 
very different from the use of force by a boarding party carrying small arms and 
other non-lethal equipment. Notwithstanding, the same principles apply, and it is 
sometimes necessary to employ the ship-borne weapon systems to enable a boarding 
party to board a suspect vessel. 
Other international law instruments 
 Of ancillary interest is the fact that the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC) adopted a Maritime Security Strategy,28 and the African Union 
(AU), an African Integrated Maritime Strategy.29 The United Nations Food and 
Agriculture Organisation have also seen a number of states committing to the 
Agreement on Port State Measures to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, 
Unreported and Unregulated Fishing, and this instrument is the first ever binding 
international treaty that focusses specifically on illicit fishing.30 Many bilateral 
agreements are in existence that could also regulate cooperation between states in 
the field of maritime law enforcement. Of course, these may have a particular bearing 
if the maritime law enforcement operation is a SADC, AU or multinational 
operation, and these aspects may have to be considered carefully in those 
circumstances, but they fall beyond the scope of the present discussion. 
Domestic legal framework 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996  
 Section 200(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, 
provides that the “primary object of the defence force is to defend and protect the 
                                                     
28 Coelho, JPB African Approaches to Maritime Security: Southern Africa (Friedrich-Ebert-
Stiftung Mozambique 2013) at 13, available at http://library.fes.de/pdf-
files/bueros/mosambik/10671.pdf. 
29 Available at https://au.int/en/documents/30928/2050-aim-strategy. 
30 Available at http://www.fao.org/3/a-i1644t.pdf; It was adopted in 2009, and entered into 
force on 5 June 2016. 
46 
Republic, its territorial integrity and its people in accordance with the Constitution 
and the principles of international law regulating the use of force”. While the defence 
and protection of the Republic and its territorial integrity clearly includes defending 
and protecting the territorial sea, the sovereign rights conferred by international law 
beyond the territorial sea could arguably be included in defending and protecting the 
Republic as well. Notwithstanding the primary object of the SANDF, section 201(2) 
of the Constitution, amongst other aspects, provides that only the president, as head 
of the national executive, may authorise the employment of the SANDF in co-
operation with the SAPS, in defence of the Republic of South Africa, or in fulfilment 
of an international obligation.  
The implication of the constitutional provisions for law enforcement at sea 
is that the SANDF may be employed operationally to support SAPS in maritime law 
enforcement operations if the SAPS were to be engaged in such operations. Another 
implication is that the SANDF could be employed to support another state in 
maritime law enforcement operations because of an international obligation, and 
such actions may also involve the application of the laws of a foreign state. However, 
the detail regarding support to another state was excluded from the scope of this 
article.  
Maritime Zones Act, 1994 (Act No. 15 of 1994) 
 The Maritime Zones Act, 1994 (Act No. 15 of 1994) is an important link 
that confirms the existence of, and declares South African jurisdiction over its 
various maritime zones. It establishes South Africa’s internal waters, territorial sea, 
contiguous zone, maritime cultural zone, EEZ and continental shelf, and provides 
for application of the Maritime Zones Act, 1994, to installations and to Prince 
Edward and Marion Islands.31 It contains the definitions of the different maritime 
zones and the coordinates of South Africa’s straight baselines. In the absence of a 
specific provision in the Constitution, which incorporates South Africa’s internal and 
territorial waters into South African territory, the Maritime Zones Act, 1994, fills a 
crucial gap in clarifying the legal status of these zones in domestic law.32  
The Maritime Zones Act, 1994, provides that “any law in force in the 
Republic, including the common law, shall also apply” in its internal and territorial 
waters “and the airspace above its internal waters”.33 In determining the South 
African jurisdiction in the contiguous, maritime cultural and exclusive economic 
zones respectively, the Maritime Zones Act, 1994, declares that the Republic shall 
                                                     
31 S 3–9 and 14. 
32 Vrancken, P ‘The Marine Component of the South African Territory’ (2010) 127 South 
African Law Journal at 207–23. 
33 S 3(2) and 4(2). 
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have the right to exercise all the powers which may be considered necessary to 
prevent contravention of any fiscal law or any customs, emigration, immigration or 
sanitary law, in respect of objects of an archaeological or historical nature found in 
the maritime cultural zone. The Republic has the same rights and powers as it has in 
respect of its territorial waters, and the Republic shall have, in respect of all natural 
resources in the exclusive economic zone, the same rights and powers as it has in 
respect of its territorial waters.34 
Defence Act, 2002 (Act No. 42 of 2002) 
 Chapter 3 of the Defence Act, 2002 (Act No. 42 of 2002) provides for the 
employment and use of the SANDF. Section 18 of the Act provides that, in addition 
to the employment of the SANDF by the president as contemplated in section 201(2) 
of the Constitution, the president or the Minister of Defence and Military Veterans 
may authorise the employment of the SANDF for service inside the Republic of 
South Africa, or in international waters, in order to: 
- preserve life, health or property in emergency or humanitarian relief 
operations;  
- ensure the provision of essential services;  
- support any department of state, including support for purposes of socio-
economic upliftment; and  
- effect national border control. 
Section 19 is concerned with the employment of the SANDF in co-operation 
with SAPS and provides that the SANDF may be employed in co-operation with 
SAPS in terms of section 201(2)(a) of the Constitution in the prevention and 
combating of crime and maintenance and preservation of law and order within the 
Republic of South Africa. Section 20 of the Defence Act, 2002, determines the 
powers of members of the SANDF while being employed for a service contemplated 
in section 201(2) of the Constitution, and under sections 18 and 19 of the Defence 
Act, 2002. Although sections 18 and 19 are not framed to have a direct maritime 
application, it is possible that operations aimed at the preservation of life, support to 
other government departments, or national border control may be conducted in the 
maritime domain, but the use of the words “within the Republic” cannot be 
interpreted to mean beyond the territorial sea.  
In Chapter 4 of the Defence Act, 2002, entitled “Law Enforcement Powers 
of the Defence Force at Sea”, it is explicitly foreseen that the SANDF will be 
engaged in law enforcement at sea. Of importance are sections 21 to 29. Section 21 
provides specific definitions for the purposes of Chapter 4. A ‘military aircraft’ is 
                                                     
34 S 5(2), 6(2) and 7(2). 
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defined as –  
[A]n aircraft of the armed forces of a State having the military marks of that State, 
commanded by a member of the armed forces and the crew of which is subject to 
regular armed forces discipline’ while ‘warship’ is defined as ‘a ship belonging to the 
armed forces of a State bearing the external marks distinguishing such ships of its 
nationality, under the command of an officer duly commissioned by the government 
of that State and whose name appears in the appropriate service list or its equivalent, 
and the crew of which is under regular armed forces discipline.35 
Section 22 deals with criminal and civil law enforcement, and is quoted in 
full below: 
Criminal and civil law enforcement by Defence Force 
(1) If requested by a competent Minister, the Chief of the Defence Force, with the 
concurrence of the Minister of Defence, may authorise the use of any military 
aircraft of the Defence Force or any warship of the Defence Force or any 
member of the Defence Force for the purpose of enforcing any provision of 
South African law at sea. 
(2) An officer on board an aircraft or a warship contemplated in subsection (1) may 
enforce South African law in- 
(a) the internal waters of the Republic; 
(b) the territorial waters of the Republic, but any measures taken must be 
carried out in accordance with paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 of article 27, and 
paragraphs 2 and 3 of article 28, of UNCLOS; and 
(c) subject to subsection (3), outside the territorial waters of the Republic. 
(3) No enforcement outside the territorial waters of the Republic may take place- 
(a) in the territorial waters of a foreign state, unless it takes place on board 
a South African ship or in pursuance of an agreement on co-operation 
in law enforcement with that state; and 
(b) against foreign ships or those on board them, except in circumstances 
permitted by international law. 
(4) An officer of the Defence Force acting in accordance with subsection (2)- 
(a) who exercises any power referred to in this section inside or outside 
the Republic, must be regarded as being a peace officer as defined in 
section 1 of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1977 (Act 51 of 1977), and 
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may exercise such power in the same manner as a peace officer 
exercising such powers within the Republic; 
(b) may exercise all other powers referred to in this Chapter; and 
(c) may exercise all or any of the powers conferred on any enforcement 
authority in terms of the relevant legislation, the provisions of which 
are being enforced by the said officer. 
(5) This section does not affect powers contemplated in sections 25, 26, 27 and 
28, or any other matters which are within the original and exclusive 
jurisdiction of the Defence Force.36 
Sections 23 to 27 provide guidance on the tactical considerations of law 
enforcement at sea with reference to the powers conferred on officials enforcing 
South African law at sea. Importantly, these sections indicate interests to be 
considered; proscribe the crime of maritime piracy; provide for the seizure of pirate 
ships or aircraft; and affirm the right of visit on high seas by warships and of hot 
pursuit of ships in accordance with UNCLOS. Section 28 places an obligation on 
SANDF warships and (military) aircraft to render assistance at sea, while section 29 
provides for the cooperation with foreign states in law enforcement at sea. 
Marine Traffic Act, 1981 (Act No. 2 of 1981)  
 The Marine Traffic Act, 1981 (Act No. 12 of 1981) regulates marine 
traffic in the Republic of South Africa, and provides for matters connected with it. 
With reference to powers of the South African Maritime Safety Authority (SAMSA) 
relating to ships on non-innocent passage through the territorial sea of the Republic 
of South Africa, section 9 provides for certain powers of SAMSA to be exercised 
when a ship is deemed to be not innocent or is believed by SAMSA to be not innocent 
in its passage. Section 9(1)(d) to (f) provides that SAMSA may require the master of 
such a ship to produce all papers or documents relative to the ship and its cargo for 
inspection and copying, to allow the ship to be boarded and the ship, its cargo and 
equipment to be inspected, and to deliver specified persons for arrest to be dealt with 
according to the law. 
In section 9, the person who is empowered to enforce these provisions is 
referred to as an ‘authorized person’, and this term is defined in section 1 of the 
Marine Traffic Act, 1981, to include any officer of the South African Navy, and any 
member of the SANDF above the rank of sergeant employed on police duties in 
terms of section 3(2)(b) of the Defence Act, 1957 (Act No. 44 of 1957), as well as 
any person accompanying such persons and acting under their instructions. Section 
3(2)(b) of the Defence Act, 1957 (Act No. 44 of 1957) was repealed by the Defence 
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Act, 2002, in 2003, but for ease of reference, the Defence Act, 1957, provided that 
the SANDF, any portion thereof, or any member may be used, in the Republic of 
South Africa, and for achieving the objects of the service in question, on those police 
functions mentioned in section 5 of the Police Act, 1958 (Act No. 7 of 1958), as may 
be prescribed.37 However, these powers would only be conferred while they were 
employed by the president for the purposes specified in the repealed section 3(2)(a) 
of the Defence Act, 1957. 
Although the powers conferred in the Marine Traffic Act, 1981, are 
relatively clear in relation to an officer of the South African Navy, the powers of the 
other ranks mentioned are diluted by the fact that the defence- and police-related 
legislation mentioned therein has been repealed. The Defence Act, 2002, fortunately 
determines that a reference in any law to a provision of the Defence Act, 1957, must 
be construed as a reference to the corresponding provision of the Defence Act, 
2002.38 
Marine Living Resources Act, 1998 (Act No. 18 of 1998) 
 Section 9 of the Marine Living Resources Act, 1998 (Act No. 18 of 1998) 
provides for the designation of posts or ranks in any organ of state as fishery control 
officers. Section 51 spells out the general powers of a fishery control officer, while 
section 52 details the powers of fishery control officers beyond South African 
waters. Sections 53 and 54 create legal grounds for the seizure of vessels and aircraft.  
Other than in the instance of the Marine Traffic Act, 1981, members of the 
SANDF are not directly referred to, although it is possible for them to be designated 
as fisheries control officers by the relevant minister. However, a member of the 
SANDF may be able to rely on section 22(4)(c) of the Defence Act, 2002, to exercise 
the powers of a fishery control officer if a lawful employment of the SANDF for this 
purpose is in place.  
Criminal Procedure Act, 1977 (Act No. 51 of 1977) 
 The Criminal Procedure Act, 1977 (Act No. 51 of 1977) is frequently 
referred to in other legislation when the powers of law enforcement officers are 
described in the context of maritime law enforcement operations. An example 
thereof is section 22(4)(a) of the Defence Act, 2002, mentioned supra. It is also of 
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great utility in that the general provisions of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1977, are 
tried and tested, and are mostly of general application. The primary example would 
be section 49 of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1977, which sets out the powers of an 
authorised person to arrest a suspect. Such suspect could be a common criminal in 
the city, or a tough maritime pirate who is prepared to fight to the death to escape. 
The provisions of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1977, which are of greatest 
importance in the present context are to be found in Chapters 2 and 5 that deal with 
search warrants, entering of premises, seizure, forfeiture and disposal of property 
connected with offences, and with arrest respectively. Although the Criminal 
Procedure Act, 1977, refers to a “peace officer”, a “police officer” or other officials, 
it is the fact that members of the SANDF are deemed to be “peace officers” in 
accordance with section 22(4) of the Defence Act, 2002, when enforcing South 
African law at sea that imports the Criminal Procedure Act, 1977, into the 
operational environment of the SANDF. Specifically, the fact that such powers are 
conferred on a soldier of the SANDF when properly authorised to conduct maritime 
law enforcement operations, bestows great importance on the Criminal Procedure 
Act, 1977, for the military commander.  
Protection of Constitutional Democracy against Terrorist and Related Activities Act, 
2004 (Act No. 33 of 2004) 
The Protection of Constitutional Democracy against Terrorist and Related 
Activities Act, 2004 (Act No. 33 of 2004) (POCDATARA), firstly aims to provide 
for measures to prevent and combat terrorist and related activities. Amongst other 
objectives and international instruments, it also gives effect to international 
instruments dealing with terrorist and related activities such as the SUA Convention. 
Marine terrorism is a phenomenon that has gained much publicity in the past, and 
although it may involve the deployment of military or paramilitary forces to combat 
it, such counter-terrorist operations remain law enforcement operations. Examples 
are the hijacking of the Santa Maria in 1961, and the Achille Lauro in 1985, and as 
these actions could not be defined as maritime piracy, another international maritime 
crime was required to prevent and punish actions certain states wanted to regard as 
crimes nevertheless.39 
Section 1 of POCDATARA provides that a member of the SANDF 
employed in co-operation with SAPS in terms of section 201(2)(a) of the 
Constitution in the prevention and combating of crime and maintenance and 
preservation of law and order within the Republic, as contemplated in section 19(1) 
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of the Defence Act, 2002, would also qualify as a police official with reference to 
section 24 of the POCDATARA. Section 24 of the POCDATARA specifically deals 
with cordoning off and stopping and searching of vehicles and persons. It determines 
that, if a warrant is issued by a judge for the purposes provided therein, any ‘police 
official’ who identifies him- or herself as such, may take the actions specified in the 
warrant.40 The ‘police official’ may then seize any article or thing contemplated in 
section 24(2), while Chapter 2 of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1977, is made 
applicable with the necessary changes required by the context in respect of any such 
article or thing.41 Section 24(4) of POCDATARA furthermore makes section 29 of 
the Criminal Procedure Act, 1977, applicable in respect of the powers conferred 
upon police officials through section 24 of POCDATARA.42 
Section 10 of POCDATARA provides for offences related to hijacking a 
ship or endangering the safety of maritime navigation. Although the other offences 
created in POCDATARA may also be committed incidentally in the maritime 
environment, it is only section 10 that is specifically related to the maritime domain, 
and this incorporates the actions contemplated in the SUA Convention as crimes 
under South African law. The offences relate to the hijacking of a ship or 
endangering the safety of maritime navigation, and may even stretch wide enough 
to incorporate actions that would otherwise be regarded as maritime piracy.  
Human rights and maritime law enforcement operations 
There are a few factors that make law enforcement in the maritime domain unique. 
The first is the fact that travelling by sea in a medium or large naval vessel is 
comparatively slow and expensive. On land, a suspect arrested 300 km from the 
nearest police station in a scarcely populated area could still be transported to the 
nearest police station in a vehicle in a matter of hours. A suspect arrested 161 nm 
from the nearest landfall by the crew of a medium or large naval vessel cannot be 
transported cheaply or quickly to land, and the nearest port may be even further 
away. The cost of travelling to a port for the sole purpose of transferring a suspect, 
linked to the negative implications of an unplanned interruption of the mission of the 
naval vessel, and the time involved (and lost) make such action prohibitive. 
This is not a unique situation for the SANDF. All navies involved in 
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maritime law enforcement are faced with the same dilemma. The European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR) is an example of where, in 1999, the Rigopoulus matter 
provided some additional guidance on how human rights law could be applied in this 
unique maritime context.43 The salient facts were that Spain arrested suspects on a 
Panamanian flagged vessel suspected of being involved in illegal drug trade. Panama 
provided consent to Spain for this purpose. The suspects relied upon their right, 
under European Human Rights standards, to be brought promptly before a court by 
alleging that their rights were violated by only appearing before a Spanish court after 
16 days of detention. Considering that the naval vessels concerned had to travel 
approximately 5 500 km (2 970 nm) from the point of arrest to the point of transfer 
of the suspects, the court found no violation of Article 5(3) of the European Charter 
of Human Rights (ECHR) that codifies the right to be brought promptly before a 
court.  
The position taken by the ECtHR in the Rigopoulus matter was confirmed in 
the Medvedyev matter of 2010 that was also heard by the ECtHR.44 In the Medvedyev 
matter, a French naval vessel intercepted a Cambodian vessel suspected of being 
engaged in illegal drug trading. The interception was conducted with the 
authorisation of Cambodia, and the suspects who were arrested had to endure 13 
days detention while the vessel carrying them traversed some 5 500 km (2 970 nm) 
of ocean to transfer the suspects. Again, the complainants alleged a violation of 
Article 5(3) of the ECHR by France. Again, the ECtHR ruled that there was no 
violation of Article 5(3) in the circumstances. It must be noted that the ECtHR held 
that the period between arrest and arraignment seemed incompatible with the 
requirement of promptness in the Rigopoulus and Medvedyev matters, but it also held 
that the exceptional circumstances present justified the prolonged detention. As it 
was accepted to have been materially impossible to bring the suspects before the 
court any earlier, the court made an allowance for the unique environment with 
which law enforcement in the maritime environment is faced. Of further interest on 
the interfaces of human rights with law enforcement in the maritime domain, Article 
5(1) of the ECHR provides that no one may be deprived of liberty except in certain 
instances, which include maritime piracy, or provisions in other treaties for such 
depravation of liberty. The international human rights concerns in the specific 
context of maritime piracy have been discussed by the same author elsewhere, and 
are not repeated herein due to its narrower focus.45  
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From a domestic law perspective, most of the rights contained in the Bill of 
Rights of the Constitution are not only applicable to nationals (referred to as 
“citizens” in the Constitution46) but to “everyone”.47 As the persons arrested by the 
SANDF in law enforcement operations at sea may be foreign nationals, this aspect 
must be considered by law enforcement officials at the point of arrest. Some of these 
rights afforded to “everyone” or “every person” are the right to human dignity, life, 
freedom and security of the person, privacy, access to courts, and specific rights for 
arrested and detained and accused persons (including due process rights but also to 
challenge the lawfulness of detention and to be detained in conditions that are 
consistent with human dignity).48  
In addition, arguments may arise about the extraterritorial application of the 
Constitution in the present context. The South African Constitutional Court has 
pronounced itself on the issue by stating that the South African Constitution is 
“territorially bound and has no application beyond our borders”.49 However, the 
judgment pronouncing thereon was concerned with persons already within the 
power, jurisdiction and territory of a foreign state, and not persons finding 
themselves within the power or under the control of South African law enforcement 
authorities. It would be unthinkable that a foreigner arrested by South African 
authorities just beyond the limits of the South African territorial sea on suspicion of 
being involved in illegal fishing, and who then appears before a South African court 
would not be able to claim due process in accordance with the South African Bill of 
Rights because anything beyond the limits of the territorial sea is technically outside 
the “territory” of the Republic. Notwithstanding extra-territorial law enforcement, 
the Constitution remains the supreme law of the Republic,50 and conduct inconsistent 
with it will be invalid, while the obligations imposed by it must be fulfilled in the 
process of South African authorities bringing a foreign suspect to a South African 
court. In any event, the state is obliged to respect, protect, promote and fulfil the 
rights in the Bill of Rights,51 and teach and require the members of the security 
services to act in accordance with the Constitution and the law.52 Finally, it would 
not make sense to apply South African fisheries legislation beyond South African 
territory (i.e. in the EEZ), and then allow those same officials to disregard the 
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Constitution when enforcing such legislation.  
With reference to the rights of arrested and detained persons, the 
Constitution dictates that an arrested person must be brought before a court as soon 
as reasonably possible, but not later than 48 hours after the arrest (or the end of the 
first court day after the expiry of the 48 hours, if the 48 hours expire outside ordinary 
court hours or on a day which is not an ordinary court day).53 The Constitution also 
provides for the limitation of rights only in terms of law of general application to the 
extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic 
society based on human dignity, equality and freedom, taking into account all 
relevant factors.54 The Constitution provides that the Bill of Rights is to be 
interpreted in the light of international law, and also that “[c]ustomary international 
law is law in the Republic unless it is inconsistent with the Constitution or an Act of 
Parliament”.55 The Constitution also stipulates that the SANDF must act in 
accordance with international law.56 The implication is that international human 
rights obligations of South Africa as well as the international law regime regarding 
the use of force in maritime law enforcement operations are applicable to the SANDF 
in the context. Section 50 of the Criminal Procedure Act (CPA) prescribes the 
procedure after arrest and makes provision for instances where it is not possible to 
bring the person to the relevant court within the constitutionally mandated 48-hour 
period.57 If the period of 48 hours expires at a time when the arrested person is 
outside the area of jurisdiction of the lower court to which he or she is being brought 
for the purposes of further detention, and he or she is at such time in transit from a 
place of detention to such court, the period shall be deemed to expire at the end of 
the court day following the day on which such arrested person is brought within the 
area of jurisdiction of the court.58 The requirement in South African law that an 
arrested person be brought before a court within 48 hours has an exception that is 
applicable to the matter in question, and which allows South Africa to detain 
suspected maritime criminals for longer periods. The minimum guarantees to be 
afforded to such suspects are, by law, equal to those afforded to any accused in South 
African courts, and are generally equal to or more than that demanded by 
international human rights instruments.  
It is anticipated that a challenge to detention for longer than the prescribed 
minimum period will be dealt with in the same manner as it has been dealt with by 
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the ECtHR, meaning that the 48-hour requirement in section 35 of the Constitution 
could be found to have been limited in accordance with section 36 of the Constitution 
by section 50 of the CPA, 1977. The South Africa court that may be required to 
consider the matter must consider international law, and may rely on the 
jurisprudence from the ECtHR in any event for interpretative purposes in accordance 
with sections 39(1) and 232 of the Constitution.  
The conditions and place of detention on a naval vessel will be influenced 
by the class and size of the vessel, and the overriding provisions of the safety and 
security of the vessel, crew, passengers and the detained persons. Simply put, smaller 
naval vessels are not the most spacious or accommodating in terms of the options 
for detention, and whatever would be practical in the circumstances will have to 
suffice. Larger vessels have options with reference to lockable cabins or other 
spaces, but the ‘luxury’ of a dedicated cell or holding facility may elude the detained 
person. Except for adequate exercise facilities, various alternatives are available that 
could be employed by the crew to detain in compliance with human rights 
requirements, which demand that the conditions of detention must be consistent with 
human dignity and the provision, at state expense, of adequate accommodation, 
nutrition, reading material and medical treatment.59  
Possible considerations for military planners and commanders 
 With the SANDF being empowered to enforce South African law at sea, the 
military commanders have several issues to consider when receiving a tasking to 
deploy for this purpose. Military considerations are generally divided into different 
levels, and there are as important considerations at national strategic and military 
strategic levels as there are at operational and tactical levels. This article is not 
concerned with the national or military strategic consequences of maritime law 
enforcement operations, and will assume that the deployment of the SANDF in 
maritime law enforcement operations has been properly authorised at national 
executive level in accordance with the requirements indicated above. 
On a conceptual level, international humanitarian law is not applicable to 
maritime law enforcement operations. Only domestic and international human rights 
law are applicable in the circumstances.60 Thus, it requires a military commander to 
remove the traditional soldiering ‘helmet’ and to replace it with the unconventional 
‘policing’ cap where the precedence of the mission is replaced by the precedence of 
fundamental rights and freedoms. This is possibly the most difficult consideration 
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for the military commander, as it requires a re-calibration of the postures and 
preparation of an entire military crew or contingent from soldier to law-enforcer. 
This is an over-arching consideration that can only be fully complied with by 
sufficient and well-rehearsed prior training that must take place long before the 
actual boots hit the ‘deck’.  
Then, once a tasking is received, it can be expected to come from the 
president, or the Minister of Defence and Military Veterans in the event of reliance 
upon sections 18(1)(c) and 18(1)(d) of the Defence Act, 2002, or from the Minister 
of Defence and Military Veterans if the deployment is authorised in terms of section 
19(1) of the Defence Act, 2002, read with section 201(2)(a) of the Constitution.61 
Section 18(1)(c) would relate to the supporting of a department of state in the 
maritime domain. Section 18(1)(d) would relate to the effecting of national border 
control at sea, and section 19(1) would relate to employment in cooperation with the 
SAPS in the maritime domain.62 In each of these three instances, it is important to 
understand what the specific powers are that are conferred on members of the 
SANDF so deployed when the SANDF is employed for those purposes, as the 
position is not the same as when the SANDF would be employed specifically for law 
enforcement at sea in accordance with Chapter 4 of the Defence Act, 2002. 
Section 19(3) of the Defence Act, 2002, determines that service in 
cooperation with the SAPS will be limited to a specified geographic area, and is 
subject to the temporal control of the president. Such service must also be performed 
in accordance with a code of conduct and operational procedures approved by the 
Minister of Defence and Military Veterans, and such guidelines regarding 
cooperation between the SANDF and the SAPS as the chief of the SANDF and the 
National Commissioner of the SAPS may determine. The section 19(3) requirements 
are not relevant in the instances of sections 18(1)(c) and 18(1)(d) employments, and 
are also not relevant in instances of employment under Chapter 4 of the Defence Act, 
2002. The specific powers conferred on members of the SANDF while employed for 
service under section 18(1) and 19(1) are equated to the powers of a member of the 
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SAPS by virtue of section 20(1) of the Defence Act, 2002, where mention is made 
of the powers conferred on members of the SAPS by specified portions of legislation, 
such as: 
- the South African Police Act, 1995 (Act No. 68 of 1995);  
- the Regulation of Gatherings Act, 1993 (Act No. 205 of 1993);  
- the Criminal Procedure Act, 1977 (Act No. 51 of 1977);  
- the Arms and Ammunition Act, 1969 (Act No. 75 of 1969); and  
- the Road Traffic Act, 1989 (Act No. 29 of 1989).  
However, such powers and duties may only be exercised or performed for 
the purposes of successful execution of employment, the prevention of crime, the 
maintenance of law and order, or the preservation of the internal security of the 
Republic of South Africa, and the powers specifically exclude the power to 
investigate crime.63 Military planners will have to assess the purposes of the 
operation carefully to ensure that such purposes are indeed authorised by law, and 
then to draw the appropriate powers from each of the laws mentioned in order to 
facilitate appropriate training to operators on the relevant provisions and related 
procedures.   
Section 20(4) to 20(10) of the Defence Act, 2002, is explicit in its 
determinations regarding – 
 the handing over of suspects and evidence;  
 liability of members of the SANDF;  
 benefits and indemnities applicable to members of the SANDF;  
 conferring of the powers attached to a peace officer as defined in the 
Criminal Procedure Act, 1977;  
 conferring of other powers ordinarily conferred on SAPS members 
holding specific ranks;  
 the command-and-control arrangements between the SAPS and the 
SANDF;  
 specific interrogation, seizure of weapons, arrest and detention, in relation 
to border control; and  
 the retention of powers otherwise conferred on members of the SANDF.  
Of particular importance to the military commander, and especially to the 
planners and executors of military operations, is that members of the SANDF so 
employed must receive appropriate training prior to such employment, and must be 
equipped accordingly.64 This implies that the military personnel who will be 
expected to take part in the operation be properly trained in the handling of suspects 
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and evidence, seizure and arrest, and be issued with appropriate equipment to mark, 
safeguard and process evidence.  
In contrast to the somewhat complex procedure to employ the SANDF in 
terms of sections 18 and 19 of the Defence Act, 2002, the employment of the SANDF 
to conduct law enforcement at sea specifically is an abbreviated procedure that 
requires only a request by a competent minister, and a decision by the chief of the 
SANDF with the concurrence of the Minister of Defence and Military Veterans.65 It 
does not, by virtue of any legal requirement, involve the president, and is an 
indication of the legislature being aware of the need to have a time-sensitive 
procedure in place to employ the SANDF quickly in instances of maritime crime. 
The chief of the SANDF may then authorise the use of any military aircraft, warship 
or member of the SANDF for the purpose of enforcing any provision of South 
African law at sea.66 Of paramount interest to the military commander is that the 
Defence Act, 2002, specifies the powers of members of the SANDF in this instance 
separately from the powers previously specified in relation to employments as 
contemplated in sections 18 and 19. Military planners and commanders will have to 
keep in mind that the ‘menu’ of powers under an employment in terms of Chapter 4 
of the Defence Act, 2002, differs from the other possible employment authorisations, 
and it is important that powers conferred in other instances not be inadvertently relied 
on in situations wherein those powers are not conferred. 
Section 23 deals with interests to be considered if (law) enforcement actions 
are being taken against a foreign ship. Section 24 incorporates the international law 
crime of maritime piracy into South African law, defines the crime, determines the 
penalties, and indicates which courts will have jurisdiction. Amongst other aspects, 
section 25 deals with the seizure of pirate ships or aircraft, and provides that an 
officer of the SANDF may seize a ship or aircraft and the property on board, and 
arrest any person on board, in accordance with the relevant provisions of UNCLOS. 
It also provides that any officer of the SANDF who exercises any power referred to 
in section 25 inside or outside the Republic of South Africa, must be regarded as 
being a peace officer as defined in section 1 of the CPA, 1977. Section 26 deals with 
the right of visit on the high seas by warships of the SANDF, while section 27 
provides for hot pursuit of ships. Section 28 provides that SANDF warships and 
SANDF (military) aircraft are to render assistance at sea, and section 29 provides for 
the cooperation with foreign states in law enforcement at sea. Many specific law 
enforcement actions are mentioned in this portion of the Defence Act, 2002, and the 
standard operating procedures and doctrine will have to be customised to incorporate 
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these specific actions in a legally compliant manner. 
Sections 22(2) and 22(3) are drafted in such a manner as to comply with the 
requirements of international law regarding the exercise of jurisdiction. These 
sections limit the powers conferred by the Defence Act, 2002, by explicitly 
determining that the powers must be exercised in accordance with the applicable 
articles of the UNCLOS, and also confirms the international law position that South 
African law enforcement officials will have powers to enforce South African law 
outside South African territorial waters, and even on the high seas or in the maritime 
zones of any other coastal state other than the territorial waters of the foreign state, 
as long as it is permitted by international law. In conformance with international law, 
the Defence Act, 2002, also permits the exercise of jurisdiction on foreign-flagged 
vessels or against those on board such vessels. These provisions force a military 
commander and planner to constantly be fully aware of the relative positions of own 
forces and suspects, and to confirm the nationality of suspects.67  
When law enforcement powers at sea are delineated, the Defence Act, 2002, 
is careful to confer the powers on commissioned officers only, and when acting in 
this capacity, those officers are regarded as being peace officers as defined in the 
CPA, 1977. The officers concerned are also obliged to exercise such power in the 
same manner as a peace officer exercising such powers within the Republic of South 
Africa, but may also exercise all other powers referred to in Chapter 4. It then takes 
the matter much further by conferring “all or any” of the powers conferred on any 
enforcement authority in terms of the legislation being enforced by the officer, on 
such officer. This is a wide-ranging provision that effectively converts SANDF 
officers into lawfully empowered customs, immigration, fisheries inspection, marine 
safety enforcement, or pollution control officers, if the legislation that is being 
enforced by the SANDF officers provides for law enforcement powers in the context. 
The subordinate’s powers to enforce South African law at sea is then linked to the 
commissioned officer’s powers to do so, and must be exercised under control and 
direction of the commissioned officers concerned. 
The effects of these provisions are that the SANDF officer may be required 
to enforce laws which would ordinarily require the enforcing official to be trained in 
at an expert level, and the SANDF officer could hardly be expected to have full 
knowledge of such laws. This situation could obviously hold great risk for the 
SANDF officer and the state if the law enforcement does not comply with the legal 
technicalities required by the laws being enforced. This may lead to evidence being 
                                                     
67 As an extreme example, see the report regarding an incident in 2016 when an Argentinian 
vessel sank a Chinese vessel suspected of fishing illegally in the Argentinian EEZ at 
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obtained unlawfully, and to arrests and detentions being declared unlawful, illegal 
or even injurious to a suspect. The way powers are linked to commissioned officers 
also implies that actions under the control of any rank lower than a commissioned 
officer rank is at risk of being regarded as ultra vires. The planner and commander 
must ensure that even the lowest tactical level actions are exercised under the 
command and control of a commissioned officer, and may even want to consider 
that a commissioned officer be present at the lowest level of law enforcement activity 
in order to ensure that the law enforcement actions are clothed with legality, or that 
subordinates are at least aware that decisions will preferably have to be referred to 
commissioned officers for the purposes of law enforcement, even though lower ranks 
could otherwise have been empowered to make tactical decisions. 
Regarding the use of force, and the drafting of rules of conduct and 
engagement for law enforcement at sea, it must be understood that rules of conduct 
and engagement drafted for conventional law of armed conflict is not suitable for 
maritime law enforcement operations and, as is the case with peace support 
operations, rules of conduct and engagement for maritime law enforcement 
operations must be carefully chosen and drafted to take international and domestic 
law into account. The drafting of such rules of conduct and engagement is 
complicated by the fact that every deployment that is based on a different law or 
employment provision may require changes to the rules of conduct and engagement 
because the powers conferred may differ. Planners and commanders will have to 
make full use of their assigned legal advisers to make sure that full compliance is 
ensured. The remarks made in relation to the use of force above remain very relevant 
in the present context too. 
What should be evident from the discussion above is that the determination 
of the specific legal basis for the SANDF’s employment is not only important for the 
authorisation of the actions on the part of the SANDF, but also determines the powers 
of members, keeping in mind that the powers when employed specifically for law 
enforcement at sea are different from when employed in support of the SAPS. In this 
regard, the rules of statutory interpretation require that a specific provision that deals 
with a particular matter be preferred above a general provision that may also regulate 
the same matter.68 Consequently, even though it is possible that the SANDF may 
enforce South African law at sea incidentally due to an employment to effect national 
border control, support the SAPS or defend the territorial integrity and sovereignty 
of the Republic of South Africa, the specific provisions relating to employment for 
law enforcement at sea must be activated to confer powers on the SANDF and 
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preferred over other general employment authorisations. 
The military commander will also be wise to take note that in instances of 
violation of the law of a foreign state, the law provides for any SANDF officer 
serving on a warship or military aircraft to seize a vessel, arrest persons aboard such 
vessels, seize property aboard such vessels, conduct hot pursuit in relation to such a 
vessel, escort the vessel to a foreign port and surrender the vessel, persons and 
property to the authorities of a foreign state.69 However, such actions are only 
allowed if there exists a reciprocal agreement on co-operation in law enforcement at 
sea with the foreign state concerned, the measures are taken in accordance with such 
agreement, and the foreign state is competent to take such actions under international 
law. In addition, it appears that hot pursuit is only provided for in the context of law 
enforcement at sea, and is not provided for in operations supporting the SAPS or 
other government departments. 
Conclusion 
South Africa has a major interest to protect in the maritime domain, and financial 
constraints on the SANDF do not make it easy to provide the support required to 
safeguard South African interests. By being a regional role player with capabilities 
that far exceed those of most other states in the region, it is not only of national 
interest, but also of regional and international interest that this capability be 
maintained, and even expanded. It also requires extraordinary insight into the effect 
that a shift from conventional military operations to law enforcement operations 
brings to the military operator, and this role demands that the unique tasks of law 
enforcement at sea be incorporated into training and doctrine at a very formal and 
institutional level for compliance to be ensured, and the interest to be safeguarded 
within the limits of the law. 
What this article has not done, was to analyse and explain the lowest tactical 
level of legal considerations, which are the method of arrest, seizure, detention and 
other related actions. The experience and training that departments, other than the 
Department of Defence, engaged in law enforcement receive could be harnessed in 
combined training and exercises to empower the SANDF and its members to become 
sufficiently acquainted with the detailed requirements of the execution of law 
enforcement actions. 
This article should also not create the impression that the SANDF has been 
unaware of the issues touched on herein, as there are many highly capable and 
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professional officers who have been, and are, already working on refining and further 
improving the capabilities of the SANDF. However, as any soldier knows, it is only 
through continuous assessment of performance, continuous training and re-training, 
and the opportunity to execute drills in operations that the required level of perfection 
can be attained. A quote ascribed to Sir William Francis Butler rings true: “The 
nation that will insist upon drawing a broad line of demarcation between the fighting 
man and the thinking man is liable to find its fighting done by fools and its thinking 
by cowards.”70 The SANDF certainly contains its share of brave and wise soldiers, 
and it is hoped that this article will assist our warriors to continue fighting and 
thinking at the same time.  
                                                     
70 Butler, WF Charles George Gordon (Macmillan & Co. 1889) at 85. 
